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ABSTRACT
The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its traditional, eudaimonistic variety
centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide a source of
normativity. This paper argues that a failure to appreciate both the giving and taking of
reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper understanding of the avail-
able options for this traditional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving reasons,
without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others, displays a
sadly illiberal form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a distortion in Jesse
Prinz’s recent discussion of the “Normativity Challenge” to Aristotelian virtue ethics,
thus highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully move beyond.
We might ask, for example: how could Socrates talk philosophy and set the discus-
sion in order without a body? But if he could not, and if the interlocutors believe
that the ability to participate in the give and take of dialectic is essential, as part of
being human, to the Socrates they know . . . then we must concede that there is
some incoherence in the wish that Socrates go off from his body to the happy life of
the blessed.
—Martha Nussbaum (1995, 93)
1. INTRODUCTION
The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics, at least in its traditional, eudaimon-
istic variety, centers on its apparently foundational appeal to nature in order to pro-
vide a source of normativity: its attempt to validate, by appealing to the nature of
human beings, that certain traits of character amount to exemplary, excellent, or vir-
tuous traits of character. But many defenders of virtue ethics have insisted that a nat-
uralistic validation of the virtues might proceed in two quite different ways. One side
of the distinction is sometimes cast in this Neurathian image: that when we extol cer-
tain traits of character as virtues of character, and when we give our reasons for doing
so, we are like sailors rebuilding our ship on the open sea. Any particular conception
of eudaimonia—the vessel by which one might navigate the ethical waters—remains
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always open to revision, an acknowledgement of its fallibility. That approach con-
trasts with a more ambitious validation of the ethical virtues, one that proceeds from
naturalistic materials that lie, already in dry dock, external to the ship. A traditional
candidate here is Aristotle’s alleged appeal to an ‘absolute’ conception of nature, re-
plete with its metaphysical biology.1 With this distinction in hand, virtue ethicists can
claim that the long-standing criticism applies only to very ambitious ‘external’ appeals
to nature.
A less ambitious validation of the ethical virtues—one that appeals, self-
consciously, to a conception of human nature that is, of course, open to dispute—
can still seem well worth our philosophical attention. Indeed, the Neurathian image
looks like an invocation of mere modesty: in this context it amounts to the familiar
liberal idea that ‘our’ conception of the best way to live, something that is of course
the product of culture, might be in various ways mistaken. Ethically sound practice
involves, according to this modest outlook, not only the giving of reasons for our
ethical conceptions, but also the taking of such reasons from those whose concep-
tions differ from our own. This idea of the ‘giving and taking of reasons’ is something
that I mean in a completely mundane sense—it is the mundane sense employed by
Martha Nussbaum when she appeals, without explication, to the ‘give and take’ of
philosophical dialectic, in the quotation with which this paper begins. Such give and
take implies neither—absurdly—accepting all of the reasons which one is offered no
matter how irrational or outlandish, nor—stubbornly—merely claiming that one will
consider the reasons which one has been offered. The claim that “I’ll consider it” is
often meant to indicate that genuine discussion has come to an end. Such a claim is
often meant, indeed, as a shut down. Hence the phrase ‘taking reasons’ is more help-
ful in this context than the phrase ‘considering reasons’, since ‘taking reasons’ is help-
fully ambiguous between someone’s genuinely and open-mindedly taking into
consideration the reasons that have been offered by others, and actually taking (or
accepting or embracing) those very reasons as her own. My claim in this paper is
that a failure to appreciate both the giving and the taking of reasons in sustaining an
ethical outlook—a failure to appreciate the kind of understanding and transforma-
tion that can be effected by a rational exchange of practical considerations between
different ethical communities—can distort one’s understanding of what an ‘internal’
validation of the virtues would ultimately amount to. To insist only on giving rea-
sons, without also taking (maybe even considering) the reasons provided by others,
displays a sadly illiberal form of prejudice.
In order to illustrate the distortion just mentioned, I will consider its appearance in
one recent discussion of virtue ethics; but I hope that the considerations advanced in
what follows make it clear that such a distortion is hardly confined to the discussion I
single out for attention. The distortion I have in mind makes a prominent appearance
in Jesse Prinz’s recent criticisms of virtue ethics (2009) from the perspective of what
he calls the “Normativity Challenge.” An examination of Prinz’s views regarding this
challenge will help illuminate the importance of both giving and taking reasons in sus-
taining an ethical outlook; but the discussion of Prinz’s views (§§2–3) will also help
bring into focus what I have thus far referred to only opaquely as the long-standing
criticism to virtue ethics.
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2 . PRINZ ON WELL-BEING AND ITS RELATION TO EUDAIMONIA
The challenge that Prinz sets for virtue ethics can itself be brought into focus by first
specifying more precisely the difference between an ‘external’ and ‘internal’ validation
of the virtues. An external validation of the virtues of character is an attempt to demon-
strate that possession of the virtues of character is necessary in order to secure some
good, or to avoid some harm, where the good in question, or the harm, is recognizable
as such independently of the particular evaluative outlook provided by possession of
the virtues themselves. The validation will thus rely on resources that are ‘external’ to
the particular evaluative outlook to be validated. By contrast, an internal validation of
the ethical virtues would be one according to which the good unattainable without the
virtues, or the harm unavoidable without them, is only recognizable as such from
within the evaluative outlook provided by possession of the ethical virtues themselves,
although this evaluative outlook might also be shared by people who (like most of us)
never manage to proceed further than Aristotelian continence.2
The aim of Prinz’s Normativity Challenge, as I understand it,3 is to press the fol-
lowing thought: that neither an external validation nor an internal validation of the
ethical virtues is at all likely to succeed. This can be demonstrated, he thinks, by ap-
pealing to empirical studies from cultural psychology that emphasize the differing
conceptions of ‘well-being’ across cultures. If neither type of validation can succeed,
then the alleged “normativity of the virtues” will remain unexplained. According to
Prinz this constitutes a more serious challenge to virtue ethics than the much-touted
‘Situationist Challenge.’ This is a challenge that Prinz thinks can be adequately an-
swered, on behalf of virtue ethicists, by appealing to the same types of studies from
cultural psychology.4 In this paper my concern will be with what Prinz says about
the Normativity Challenge to virtue ethics.
Before turning to that, some preliminaries are in order. Specifically, something
needs to be said about Prinz’s understanding of the appeal, within Aristotelian ver-
sions of virtue ethics, to the notion of eudaimonia or “flourishing.” For it immediately
becomes unclear which proponents of virtue ethics Prinz has in mind in his discus-
sion. The question that Prinz puts to virtue ethics is this (2009, 132): “What is the
source of this obligation,” he asks, the one that says that we “should cultivate the vir-
tues”? Having asked this question, Prinz goes on to characterize, on the subsequent
page, what he apparently takes to be some genuinely Aristotelian answers to it.5 He
insists that, whereas theists might see the normativity of the virtues in terms of divine
command, Aristotelians “tend to go another route.” More specifically, they argue
“that morality derives from natural teleology.” By appealing to such natural teleology,
the proponents of an Aristotelian virtue ethics maintain that, “The normativity of the
virtues derives from the fact that they are the end to which our nature directs us, and
thus constitute human flourishing.”
However, flourishing is not at all constituted, on an Aristotelian view, by any state
or disposition of character, not even virtue. Aristotle’s own view, which has hardly
been rejected by prominent defenders of virtue ethics,6 maintains that eudaimonia is,
over a complete life, rational activity in accordance with virtue (NE 1098a16–18).
Thus on Aristotle’s view, the flourishing life is a life constituted by a certain type of
activity, not by a state or disposition of a person’s psychology. No state or disposition
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of a person’s psychology, not even virtue, could possibly constitute flourishing as
Aristotle understands it. This is because the possession of that state or disposition,
whatever it is, remains consistent with a completely inactive life, a life that involves
no virtuous activity (NE 1098b30–1099a5; cf. 1102b5–8). Hence whatever traits of
character the ethical virtues turn out to be, activity in accordance with those traits,
over a complete life, just is what flourishing, according to Aristotle, ultimately is.
A life of virtuous activity is also, of course, a life of affect: it is a life of both doing
and feeling, a life that good people find enjoyable. Perhaps it is on the basis of such
Aristotelian thoughts that Prinz says that flourishing is “widely presumed to involve
certain affective states.” He then claims (1) that flourishing is “related to” well-being
and (2) that well-being is “an affective construct,” a “subjective state.” Prinz goes on
to clarify that for Aristotelians the virtues are good “not simply because they make us
feel good, but because they make us feel good in a way that is indicative or constitu-
tive of having fulfilled our natural ends as a species.” The view that Prinz has in
mind maintains that, “Well-being confers normative status not because of its hedonic
qualities, but because of its teleological status.” Thus, according to the ‘Aristotelian’
versions of virtue ethics that Prinz has in mind, Aristotelian flourishing (eudaimonia)
drops out of the picture altogether, except insofar as it ‘relates to’ subjective concep-
tions of well-being. One might therefore characterize the target of Prinz’s arguments
here as ‘Aristotelianism without eudaimonia.’7 What is the new empirical challenge
that Prinz takes to be problematic for virtue ethics so understood?
3 . THE LONG-STANDING CRITICISM OF VIRTUE ETHICS
The Normativity Challenge seems to press the idea that neither an external valida-
tion nor an internal validation of the ethical virtues is at all likely to succeed.
Consider what Prinz says about each of these approaches for validating certain traits
of character as genuine virtues of character.
An internal, Neurathian validation of the virtues would be, as I said above, an attempt
to demonstrate that there is some good, say, that is unattainable without possession of
the ethical virtues, where the good in question is recognizable as such only from within
the evaluative outlook provided by possession of the ethical virtues themselves.
However, as Prinz points out in considering this type of proposal, showing that a certain
tendency is natural obviously falls well short of showing that it is good, since whole cul-
tures might have natural tendencies toward violence and warfare. Perhaps we can draw a
distinction, though, between natural tendencies that are “noble” and those that are not.
But Prinz insists that, “It is hard to do this without circularity.” This is because one “can-
not define noble natural tendencies as those that accord with virtue, and then argue that
virtues derive normativity from their status as natural” (2009, 133–34). That is Prinz’s ar-
gument against an internal validation of the ethical virtues. I will return to it briefly below
in §5, after considering the alternative, external approach.
An external validation of the ethical virtues is an attempt to demonstrate that there is
some good, say, that is recognizable as such independently of the evaluative outlook pro-
vided by the ethical virtues and that is clearly unattainable without possession of those
virtues. In order to articulate such a validation, virtue ethicists might want, Prinz says,
“to beef up their notion of well-being” (2009, 134). The strategy would be this: “If a
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substantive account of well-being can be offered that makes no reference to virtue, then
we can define the virtues as the natural behaviors that promote well-being without any
circularity” (2009, 134). Here one might compare Prinz’s formulation of a substantive ac-
count of well-being to Thomas Hurka’s formulation (unacknowledged in Prinz’s paper)
of the same idea. As Hurka puts this idea: “A substantive conception equates flourishing
with some determinate state F of people or their lives, where both the nature and the
goodness of F are defined independently of the virtues” (Hurka 2001, 235; quoted in
Annas 2008).8
Prinz, however, thinks that there is an obvious problem with this substantive strat-
egy. This is the fact that “there are well-documented cultural differences in which fac-
tors matter” for well-being (2009, 134). After noting some of the empirical studies
documenting these cultural differences (studies which I have no reason to question
for my purposes here), Prinz sums up this line of thinking as follows:
This variation has serious implications for virtue ethics. Virtue ethicists have tradi-
tionally assumed that there is a universal set of virtues; indeed many virtue ethicists
try to list them. And, they assume that these virtues are universal precisely because
they are all part of a universal human nature. But that supposition is untenable.
What leads to fulfillment in life is neither universal nor entirely natural. Culture
can shape our conception of the good life. (2009, 134)
In this passage, the word “fulfillment” presumably refers to well-being, achieved accord-
ing to a specific conception of it. Hence Prinz’s thought can be put like this: subjective
conceptions of well-being, resulting as they do from the influence of culture, are neither
universal nor entirely natural. Thus the prospects for ‘deriving’ a universal list of the vir-
tues from an account of well-being, construed in these terms, seems especially dim. An
external validation of a set of universal virtues—a validation that takes a subjective con-
ception of well-being to be the good that is unattainable without the virtues—is not, as
Prinz sees it, very likely to succeed. He nevertheless considers what he takes to be the
available options, at this point, for defenders of an Aristotelian version of virtue ethics.
The options constitute, he says, an unattractive dilemma. On the first horn of the
dilemma, virtue ethicists might defend the idea that—in spite of the wide cultural
variation in subjective conceptions of well-being—there is, nevertheless, a universal
set of ethical virtues that promotes “all forms of well-being” (2009, 136). This is
what we might call the off-brand conception of virtue. Prinz rightly passes over this
idea without comment.
On the second horn of the dilemma, virtue ethicists might maintain that some con-
ceptions of well-being are, after all, better than others. But Prinz says that “such an ar-
gument would inevitably hinge on one of two mistakes” (2009, 136). The first mistake
is this: In assessing alternative conceptions of well-being “from within” (or better:
from) our own evaluative outlook, we would “inevitably,” Prinz says, “impose our own
conception of well-being on others, when determining which is best” (2009, 136).
This would amount to an objectionable form of cultural chauvinism (I will return to
this point below in §4.) The second mistake would be to go further external: to argue
from an allegedly neutral, cultural-free standpoint that some conceptions of well-being
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emerge as more natural, and therefore as ‘better’, than others. Prinz’s passionate rejec-
tion of any such appeal is worth quoting at length, since it encapsulates the ‘long-stand-
ing’ criticism of virtue ethics that I referenced at the outset. Prinz points out that this
external strategy “assumes a conception of the human species that is profoundly false.”
He elaborates:
We are a cultural species, and it is part of our nature that our values should be
forged in the context of human interactions. To the extent that those interac-
tions engender different conceptions of well-being, as the empirical literature
shows, we cannot pretend that there is some pre-social, purely natural concep-
tion. That is the myth of the noble savage. Indeed, if we could find such a
pre-cultural conception, it would have scant normative force, for conceptions
of well-being that did not emerge through cultural processes would hardly be
applicable or conducive to thriving once we find ourselves situated in a cultural
context. Faith in a universal form of well-being teeters between cultural chau-
vinism and a form of naturalism rivaling Spencer’s in its naivete´ and vulgarity.
(2009, 136)
The main thing to say, however, about the position targeted by this long-standing
criticism is that many quite prominent defenders of a eudaimonistic version of virtue
ethics have explicitly rejected it.9 Certainly as an interpretation of Aristotle, the view
has been fairly well repudiated. Julia Annas, for instance, writing more than twenty
years prior to Prinz’s paper, insists quite generally that:
The Greeks did not support their various claims about happiness and virtue by
an appeal to teleology, nor to a fixed and determinate pattern of human nature
which would impose on the recalcitrant agent a rigid and specific set of aims
and mode of life. The appeal was rather to what we would call the best avail-
able moral psychology—something much more general, and disputable.
(1988, 165)10
Hence the long-standing criticism of virtue ethics, as Prinz seems not to realize, is well
off the mark. The appeal to an allegedly neutral, teleological conception of nature—as
many contemporary virtue ethicists have long recognized—ought to be abandoned.
Nevertheless, if a certain culture stands equipped with a subjective conception of well-
being, one that its members consider to be better than the alternative conceptions,
won’t this attitude of superiority “inevitably” lead, as Prinz says, to imposing their con-
ception of well-being on others? Won’t insisting on the superiority of ‘our’ conception
of well-being amount to a form of cultural chauvinism? The answers to these questions
will help illustrate the distortion that I hope to bring out: the culprit is failing to appre-
ciate the importance of both giving and taking reasons in sustaining an ethical outlook.
In order to illustrate the phenomenon I have in mind, in the next section I consider,
at some length, a case that Prinz deploys from cultural psychology. It involves two con-
trasting conceptions of well-being from two different cultural communities. What can
we learn from such a case?
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4. AGRARIAN TOLERATION AND IMPERIALISM
Suppose that the well-being of a certain agrarian community depends upon various
forms of cooperation in the sharing of agricultural resources (cf. Prinz 2009, 129).
The members of this community therefore tend to value cooperativeness in the shar-
ing of such resources. Moreover, they insist that their own cooperative conception of
well-being is better than the one embraced by the herders in the hills. The herders
work in isolation and are, as a result, more prone to violence, for instance in defense
of their flocks. Do the agrarians display a form of cultural chauvinism, insofar as they
consider their own cooperative conception of well-being to be better than the violent
alternative? Are they bound “inevitably” to impose their conception of well-being on
others? There are many things to say in response to these questions, the answers to
which, as we saw above, Prinz takes to be obviously affirmative. Here I will mention
three points that suggest otherwise.
First, if the agrarians can prosper without interference from the herders, then the
agrarians may not be, and perhaps should not be, especially concerned about the
herders’ tendencies toward violence. If a life that is overly prone to violence contrib-
utes to the different type of well-being enjoyed by the herders—given that the hills
are so dangerous—then so much the better for the herders, and for their flocks. The
agrarians need not be, and perhaps should not be, in any way involved. They need
not even understand the way of life in the hills in order to adopt this attitude of toler-
ation.11 In any case, even if they did understand it, what reasons could the agrarians
give (left as the herders are to fend for themselves) to embody the ‘agrarian’
virtues—e.g., the virtue of trust? The agrarians could of course insist that the virtue
of trust contributes, as they themselves see it, to the well-being of agrarians. But they
cannot plausibly insist that such a trait contributes to the well-being of herders: If
the hills are especially dangerous, then such a claim is simply false. (Recall that we
have already dismissed the implausible off-brand conception of virtue.) Hence the
question of imposing a specific conception of well-being on others need not arise.
Nor need the agrarian attitude of tolerance amount to a form of cultural chauvinism;
the attitude that I have described can be maintained in full awareness that the herd-
ers look down in condescension on the agrarian way of life. This all remains perfectly
consistent with the agrarians’ insistence that their own conception of well-being is
much better than the alternative conception, the one that incorporates habitual
violence.
Of course the situation becomes rather different—this is the second point—if
the herders descend from the hills. It may be that the herders threaten, not the
agrarian way of life, but at least the lives of certain agrarians. In this case there
may be no alternative to threatening sanctions against the herders: If the case be-
comes desperate, this will become the threat of violence, or, at the limit, simply
violence. But in this case the imposition of a peaceful coexistence, by means of
threatened external sanctions, looks like a justifiable imposition. (I will come back
to “looks” in the next paragraph.) The situation becomes different again, of
course, if the herders threaten, or even seem to threaten, the agrarian way of life.
In that case the well-being of the agrarians becomes, or seems to become, com-
promised. The question that arises then—whether defending one’s way of life
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justifies the threat of sanction, and even violence, in the face of a real or per-
ceived threat from some new cultural element—is obviously a question that is
too large to address adequately here. But what I do want to insist upon should
be predictable. In a society comprising members from both the agrarian and the
herder communities—i.e., in a multicultural society—only a regrettably illiberal
form of prejudice can seem to justify giving reasons for one’s own conception of
well-being while refusing to take into consideration the reasons provided by
others for their differing conceptions. Charles Taylor remarks in a similar context
on what he takes to be a “general truth” about life in a society that is both multi-
cultural and democratic; this general truth is that “contemporary democracies, as
they progressively diversify, will have to undergo redefinitions of their historical
identities, which may be far-reaching and painful” (Taylor 2011, 317). What this
observation highlights is that, although the agrarians may initially consider their
own conception of well-being to be better than that of the herders—and although
there may be nothing objectionable about that—the agrarians still cannot justifi-
ably close their minds to the reasons offered by the herders for their different
conception of well-being, violence-prone though it may be. Presumably there are
reasons (which, for all we know, may be excellent reasons) for their traditional se-
curity concerns; and so presumably there are also reasons for their tendencies to-
ward violence. Perhaps it will be the agrarians who come to realize—after taking
(or accepting or embracing) such security reasons from the herder community—
that their own agrarian conception of well-being is overly pacific or naive, or any-
way too prone to a blind and defenseless form of trust.12
These considerations lead us to a third and final point about imposing our con-
ception of well-being on others. While I said that the threat of sanctions against the
herders looks, in some cases, like a justifiable imposition, it is a good question
whether any behavior can in fact be ethically justified here, given the restrictions on
the type of ‘external’ validation under discussion. This is an attempt, recall, to ‘derive’
a universal set of virtues from a subjective conception of well-being “that makes no
reference to virtue” (Prinz 2009, 134). In that case, though, if the agrarian concep-
tion of well-being is ‘substantive’ in Prinz’s sense, in the sense of being articulable
without making any reference to virtue, then the threat of sanctions can only appar-
ently be justifiable in this pragmatic sense: because such activity promotes agrarian
well-being. In that case, though, any action that genuinely promotes the well-being of
the agrarians will turn out to be, in that pragmatic sense, justifiable. The problem
here is not, as Prinz says, that since the agrarians consider their own conception of
well-being to be better than that of the herders, this means that they will ‘inevitably’
impose their conception of well-being on others. Nor is the problem here, as I ar-
gued above, that the attitude of superiority amounts to a form of cultural chauvinism.
The problem is rather that without the giving and the taking of reasons—without
the rational exchange of practical considerations between the agrarian and herder
communities—an insulated and culture-bound conception of well-being provides a
recipe for justifiable cultural imperialism. This consequence, though, is not a problem
for eudaimonistic versions of virtue ethics, but rather for Prinz’s understanding of
them.13
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5 . CONCLUSION: GIVING AND TAKING REASONS
The discussion so far would seem to leave an ‘internal’ validation of the ethical vir-
tues as the remaining strategy for answering Prinz’s Normativity Challenge. Such a
validation, as I said, would be an attempt to demonstrate that possession of the ethi-
cal virtues is necessary in order to secure some good, or to prevent some harm,
where the good in question, or the harm, is recognizable as such only from
within the evaluative outlook provided by possession of the virtues themselves. Thus
the good to be achieved by possession of the virtues will rather obviously not be
characterizable without any (even implicit) reference to them. But the outlook in
question can also be shared by people who, like most of us, never manage to proceed
further than Aristotelian continence. And the possibility of shared overlap amongst
differing ethical conceptions makes theoretical and ethical progress possible. An ap-
preciation of the kind of giving and taking of reasons that I am advocating requires,
as I suggested above, a kind of modesty that allows for an open-ended rational ex-
change with others, with those who hold different ethical conceptions than our own.
And this modesty, when actually embodied, ought to mitigate familiar worries about
circularity,14 or about the inevitability of imposing our conception of the good life
on others. Moreover, this way of understanding an internal validation of the virtues,
by insisting upon the giving and taking of reasons, seems anyway to be required by
any version of eudaimonism that hopes to steer clear of the long-standing criticism
of virtue ethics.15
In order to effect ethical progress, those engaged in ethical reflection need to ac-
knowledge the two reciprocal practices that invoke ethical reasons here—not only
the practice of giving reasons for our ethical conceptions, but also the practice of tak-
ing the reasons of others into account, even though these others may embrace ethical
conceptions that differ radically from our own. Thus perhaps the Neurathian imag-
ery, at least for eudaimonistic versions of virtue ethics, might emerge as less than
fully appropriate, since according to the strategy defended in this paper, the vessel in
question—a specific conception of eudaimonia—would remain helpfully porous. Or
perhaps this dual practice, of giving and taking reasons, needs to invoke a slightly dif-
ferent image: one that involves a fusion of ethical horizons. Regarding this different,
Gadamerian image, Charles Taylor has observed that the slogan here might be: “no
understanding the other without a changed understanding of self” (2002, 295).
Hence the illiberal prejudice involved in my discussion might also be thought of as
an implicit and unjustified rejection of, or at least a resistance to, the idea encapsu-
lated in this slogan, of a changed understanding of our own ethical outlook, and also
(one might add) of a changed understanding of ourselves.16
NOTES
1. The allusions here are to Bernard Williams (1985, ch. 3) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, ch. 12). For other
influential advocates of this general reading of Aristotle, see the works cited in Nussbaum (1995, n. 2).
2. For this account of the distinction, and for discussion, see Birondo (2015). On the nonmatching overlap
between the continent person’s outlook and the virtuous person’s outlook in specific cases, see
McDowell (1979), especially §3.
3. An interpretation of Prinz’s argument here is somewhat hampered by the fact that, in the section of his
paper devoted to explicating the ‘Normativity Challenge’ (sometimes also the ‘Normative Challenge’),
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various views are attributed to Aristotle, and to contemporary ‘Aristotelian virtue ethicists’, without there
being any citations to Aristotle, or to any contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethicists. A possible exception
is Prinz’s reference to Martha Nussbaum, in support of the claim that, in Prinz’s words, “some cultures
may find exposure to the natural environment more important than others” (Prinz 2009: see section 4,
“Normativity: Another Empirical Challenge to Virtue Ethics”). Hence, Prinz’s new empirical challenge
to virtue ethics relies on what he apparently considers to be the a priori options for it.
4. However, even this much is unclear: Mark Alfano has issued some worries about whether Prinz’s appeal
to such studies, on behalf of virtue ethicists, actually does answer the situationist challenge. See Alfano
(2013, 51–52).
5. The quotations from Prinz in this section of my paper will accordingly be from that page of Prinz’s pa-
per: (2009, 133).
6. See, for instance, McDowell (1980), Annas (1993), Nussbaum (1995), Hursthouse (1999).
7. Sebastian Purcell (2014) has argued, in response to this ‘Normativity Challenge’, that Prinz’s under-
standing of Aristotelian eudaimonia relies on presuppositions “that are not supported by a careful reading
of the Nicomachean Ethics.” My own response cannot quite muster Purcell’s admirable charity.
8. In defense of virtue ethics, Julia Annas responds by insisting that, “Where success is defined indepen-
dently of the virtues, it will always be hopeless to try to show that the virtues are a good way of achieving
that” (2008, 214).
9. See, for instance, McDowell (1995), Hursthouse (1999), Annas (2008), Russell (2009). MacIntyre is a
special case here, since he rejects the natural-teleological position targeted by the long-standing criticism
(1984) but also again (1999) feels its attractions. But even on MacIntyre’s later view, as Christopher
Toner has recently stressed, some Neurathian considerations are at work. See Toner (2008, §§5–6).
10. Regarding Aristotle in particular, Annas writes that, “Aristotle does not have a ‘universal teleology’, and
the teleology he has is not a theory about human lives” (1988, 156). (Some of the material from this arti-
cle, Annas [1988], was later incorporated, in an expanded form, in an even more prominent venue:
Annas [1993, Part II, “Justification and the Appeal to Nature”]. See p. 136, n. 4.) Other prominent inter-
pretations of Aristotle’s ethics that would show the long-standing criticism to be quite off target include
McDowell (1980) and, in exquisite detail, Nussbaum (1995).
11. These claims are not meant to deny that there can of course be cases in which humanitarian intervention
is justified.
12. The point here is not to make an empirical prediction about the likelihood of convergence between ini-
tially differing conceptions of well-being, but rather to highlight its rational possibility.
13. Nor is it the case that Aristotelian versions of eudaimonism fall prey to the charge under discussion, of
imposing a specific conception of the good life on others. Julia Annas provides some of the reasons why
not. See Annas (2008, 217).
14. On the worry about circularity, consider a few especially prominent discussions that are not considered
or acknowledged in Prinz’s paper: Annas (1993), Nussbaum (1995), McDowell (1995). In dismissing
the ‘internal’ strategies deployed in these discussions, it does not seem to me to be sufficient to remark,
without any detailed consideration of the discussions themselves, that it is “hard to do this without circu-
larity” (Prinz 2009, 133). Moreover, as I have understood the notion in this paper, the giving and the
taking of reasons should mitigate worries from this direction: Even if one eventually arrives back at the
same point from which one’s rational reflection set off, there was no guarantee, in advance of such reflec-
tion, that this outcome would eventuate; and of course it may not eventuate. The image of circularity
here is a bogeyman. (See also the subsequent note.)
15. Nevertheless, Christopher Toner has recently issued the following objection in defense of a broadly
MacIntyrean-Thomistic picture of universal human nature: that the sort of naturalism defended by
McDowell (e.g., in McDowell [1995]) “seems to give way to a lightly constrained moral relativism, in
which morality is multiply, and variably, realized in a diverse assortment of cultures” (Toner 2008, 228).
MacIntyre himself maintains quite differently that, “It has often been thought by Thomists . . . that to ac-
knowledge the historically conditioned character of philosophical—or for that matter scientific or
historical—inquiry is to make a certain kind of relativism inescapable. And it was one of the several
achievements of [Hans-Georg Gadamer’s] Wahrheit und Methode to have shown that this is not so”
(MacIntyre 2002, 158). For McDowell’s response to the general charge of relativism, invoking both
Gadamer and Donald Davidson, see McDowell (2002). Although I cannot develop this point here, a
view like Toner’s seems to me to display a version of the prejudice that I have aimed to articulate in this
paper; a fuller treatment would be required to show exactly how so.
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16. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, for
the Reason and Virtues Conference in 2015, and also at Wichita State University. Thanks are due
to the participants on each of these occasions and to the conference organizers; to the students in
my History of Ethics (2015) and Contemporary Ethics (2014) courses; and to two anonymous ref-
erees for The Monist. Special thanks are due to my colleagues Robert Feleppa and David Soles for
their extremely helpful written comments; to Lillian Dickerson, Avery Kolers, Kate Phelan, and Kai
Spiekermann, for their much-needed encouragement; and to Robert Audi for his generosity and
support.
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